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I. The Problem of Language.—If we include under the 
heading of language all of its varieties of expressive and 
communicative behavior we will find language to be not far 
from our most pervasive form of action. Not a moment of our 
lives passes but that we perform a great many language 
reactions, either alone or in conjunction with other types of 
behavior. Consider that language reactions comprise not only 
speaking and reading but also are essentially involved in such 
complex behavior as musing, desiring, thinking, dreaming, 
planning and willing; in fact we might say that language 
responses not only constitute important exclusive adaptations 
to stimuli but parallel and complement almost all of our 
complex behavior. 
And yet it is not incorrect to say that such widespread and 
important reactions as language consists of, have not been 
adequately treated by psychologists. True it is that Wundt has 
given us a two-volume treatise on language, but unfortunately 
that writer was mainly interested to place a structuralistic 
psychological foundation under the data of the philologist with 
the consequence that the treatise does not handle the facts of 
language as specifically psychological activities but rather as 
external manifestations of mental states or the social products 
of psychic processes. Likewise, the behaviorist has recently 
given some prominence to discussions of language, but he 
again has been merely concerned to establish the objectivity of 
thought by identifying it with expression; so that the 
behaviorist just as much as the introspectionist has foregone 
the treatment of language as distinct concrete adaptations to 
stimuli along with the other types of psychological reactions.    
In view of this situation 
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the writer undertakes an analysis of language reactions as 
prominent and significant data of objective psychology. 
II. Differentiation of Psychological from other Language Data. 
(1) The Anthropological Data.—Close study of language 
phenomena impresses us seriously with the extreme necessity of 
differentiating the psychological facts of language from other 
language data, for obviously, language phenomena constitute the 
subject-matter of several humanistic sciences. Is not language just 
as essentially a cultural fact, a matter of historical development, of 
social custom as it is a series of specific responses to particular 
stimuli? Now it is precisely the circumstance that language 
belongs to different domains of investigation which makes it 
difficult to keep separate the different approaches to language 
study, but which at the same time makes it so rigorously 
imperative that such a distinction between different data be 
observed. Penalties in abundance pursue us when we confound the 
different types of language data, for then we almost inevitably 
misinterpret our facts. When we ask what it is that makes 
especially difficult the distinction of psychological language from 
anthropological language we find this answer, namely, that the 
data of anthropological language, that is to say, language customs 
and traditions, constitute genuine though potential phases of 
psychological behavior segments, to wit, stimuli to language 
responses. To be more explicit, it is undoubtedly true that when 
individuals are about to develop language reactions such 
development is subject to the conditioning pressure of customs 
and institutions developed by their groups, but until such 
institutions actually function as stimuli to language behavior they 
cannot be called psychological facts. The difficulty in keeping 
anthropological language in the form of institutional and cultural 
entities distinct from psychological facts arises from the 
circumstance that group language institutions are often activities, 
but be it noted that such behavior must be looked upon as the 
abstracted activities of groups and their various influences upon 
one another and not as the concrete responses of persons to 
specific stimuli. 
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(2) Philological Language Data.—Much the same care 
employed in distinguishing between the psychological and 
anthropological phases of language must be exercised in keeping 
distinct the psychological and philological aspects. For 
philological data and interpretations have to do mainly with fixed 
forms of socially prevalent language institutions and their periodic 
variation1 and not at all with the concrete forms of language 
responses such as especially concern the psychologist. And so we 
may say that the philologist gets no closer to the psychologist's 
data than does the anthropologist, although the philologist may be 
exclusively concerned with the facts of some particular language, 
and not languages as social institutions. That is to say, the philolo-
gist may also deal with the institutional stimuli of genuine 
language reactions but this is only one kind of language fact, and 
one which, unless it is contained in an actual response situation, or 
behavior segment, consists of conventions of speech rather than 
speech itself. When the philologist's material is not part of a 
behavior segment, such as the contents of a book when it is not 
being read, this material may be considered as a physical object 
exactly like any other kind of physical thing. Not incorrect is it to 
say that the philologist is interested in evidences of speech, 
spoken or written, as well as in standards of speech and only very 
remotely concerned with the psychological adaptations consti-
tuting language behavior, for the latter involves much more than is 
comprised in customary speech. To be brief, the philologist is 
essentially interested in fixed modes of phonetic systems and their 
symbolic representation and not in actual responses to stimuli. 
Because the philologist is interested in conventional sounds 
and their symbolization his data and interpretations cannot be 
directly accepted by the psychologist. In the first place, many of 
the philologist's problems fall without the province of psychology 
since they have developed entirely as historical facts; among such 
facts are the problems of gender, the development of inflection or 
analysis  and the  absence of 
1 As exemplified by such laws as Grimm's, Grassmann's, Verner's, etc. 
270 J. R.KANTOR 
words expressing abstract ideas. In the second place, the 
philologist is moved by his interest in the conventional to exclude 
interjectional reactions or to think of them as evolutionary 
prototypes of standardized speech, in other words, to place too 
great emphasis upon standard words whether as roots or affixes or 
as combinations of the two. And in the third place, the philologist 
assumes that language is a series of symbols for the 
communication of ideas through definite and even logical vehicles, 
namely, sentences. To accept the philologist's material manifestly 
would put the psychologist at a great disadvantage for it would 
cause him to overemphasize the crystallized products and results of 
historical reactions and to pay scant attention to actual present 
behavior. 
(3) Psychological Language Data.—In striking contrast to both 
of the above treatments of language, the psychologist must look 
upon language as a series of intimate actions of particular persons, 
speaking, reading, listening, gesturing and interjecting, in short, 
adaptive responses.1 As a student of language the psychologist is 
not interested in the existence of language or languages even when 
those are considered as reactional products. That the psychologist's 
interest in language is a much more particularized one appears 
from the fact that even when the work of the anthropologist and 
philologist overlaps that of the psychologist, that is to say, when 
the former scientists handle language as psychological phenomena, 
they deal with transmissive action only, while the psychologist, on 
the other hand, must carefully take note of the receptive aspect of 
language also, to wit, the receiving response actions of language 
behavior. 
In sum, from the psychological standpoint language comprises 
various sorts of adjustmental behavior, diverse adaptations to 
surrounding stimuli. Such reactions, in common with other types 
of psychological response, serve as definite 
1 And so it is entirely incorrect from a psychological standpoint to define language 
as "a system of signs, different from the things signified, but able to suggest them" 
(James), for while this definition does touch some psychological language facts 
namely, signs, it excludes the essential features of language and replaces them with 
the data of philology. 
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means of accomplishing specific results. In consequence, for the 
psychologist language reactions are unique personal and 
practically serviceable or expressive reactions. Whatever is 
common or standard about such behavior is due entirely to the 
commonness and institutional character of the stimuli which 
condition the acquisition of the specific phases of language 
reactions and which call them out when they are acquired. 
77/. What are the Psychological Characteristics of Lan-
guage?—Our first approach to a psychological investigation of 
language forces upon us the conviction that language is far from 
easy to define and therefore it is essential that we formulate as 
clear a criterion as possible to mark off language responses from 
other kinds of action. Upon reviewing many facts of language, we 
do arrive, however, at this distinguishing mark which we believe 
rather definitely divides off language reactions from other kinds of 
psychological facts, to wit, that language reactions are inherently 
indirect or referential adaptations to stimuli. 
In order to examine and establish this criterion it is best first to 
contrast language reactions with some of the most direct and 
immediate forms of responses. Such direct responses are 
illustrated by simple reflex action or complex esthetic reaction to a 
picture or other work of art, as well as thinking about some thing 
or person. Such acts have no further reference to present or non-
present objects or persons; nothing else but the one directly 
functioning stimulus and response is involved in the behavior 
segment. 
Generalizing the fact of indirectness of action which 
characterizes language behavior we might say that language 
involves at least two stimuli, one the adjustment stimulus, the 
thing, event or person talked about, referred or otherwise 
responded to, and the other the stimulus object or person 
provoking the action, whether talking, thinking or some sort of 
overt behavior. 
Illustrative of the indirectness of language behavior is the 
ordinary conversation or communication reaction. 'A' desires some 
object picked up; he therefore offers 'B' a verbal 
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or gestural stimulus which we may call the auxiliary stimulus, and 
which serves as the means to bring about 'B"s reaction to the book 
which may be called for our present purposes the adjustment 
stimulus. What is essentially language in this situation is the 
indirect action which 'A' performs with respect to the object picked 
up. The specific means by which the indirect reaction is 
accomplished, whether through spoken words or pointing gestures 
makes no difference so far as the language features of the situation 
go. 
Perhaps more clearly can we appreciate the operation of the 
indirect response when we alter our point of vantage from that of 
the speaker or the person who uses the language as an instrument 
to bring about an indirect response to a stimulus object, to that of 
the person who is involved in the actual carrying out of the 
reaction. Now while the second person adjusts himself directly to 
the stimulus object, say a book that he was told to pick up, he at 
the same time is involved in an indirect response to the request or 
speech stimulus. 
But here we can imagine someone saying, "Is this action of 
picking up the book not a direct response on the part of 'B' to the 
request of 'A' as stimulus?" Considerable ambiguity we must admit 
to exist here, but we believe only with respect to the name of the 
stimulus. For observe, that it is hardly probable that 'B' is in fact 
performing a direct action to 'A,' but rather to 'A"s request. But if 
the latter is true, then because the action of 'A' (the command) is a 
referential act, 'B' 's response itself cannot but refer to the book and 
hence the request is only an auxiliary stimulus, and if we do not 
allow this then we may still say that the person who gives the 
command is not like an ordinary natural object in his role as 
stimulus. To an ordinary natural object we can only perform direct 
action, both where the object serves as a substitution or as an 
adjustment stimulus, while in the case of the person his 
significance as a stimulus lies precisely in the fact that he can refer 
to things aside from himself by means of conventional signs, 
which he and those with whom he communicates,  have developed 
in common 
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social situations. The two stimuli can equally well be analyzed 
when the person talks to himself as when he is reacting to another 
person. That means to say, that when I speak to myself about 
myself I am both adjustment and auxiliary stimulus to myself as 
acting person. Again, when I perform a direct reaction to some 
object, say a fright or startle response, to an automobile which 
barely misses striking me, that object or the accident situation may 
be both auxiliary and adjustment stimulus for a secondary or 
indirect reaction. It is possible of course that we can react directly 
to persons as we do to natural objects but in this case we should 
not attempt to consider any phase of the situation as language. 
Whilst the form of language which we have just been 
discussing and which we name communicative may fairly be 
called typical it is not by far the most important or the most widely 
prevalent of our language behavior. But certain it is, however, that 
in all behavior properly denominated language we can distinguish 
the two stimulating situations or circumstances. And upon the 
particular mode of contact with these two stimuli we can in our 
opinion establish the criterion of indirectness for language 
reactions. 
Two types of indirectness or degrees of language reactions may 
be distinguished upon the basis of what might be called from a 
biological or social standpoint the absence of direct adjustments to 
stimuli, or perhaps the absence of any overtly adjustmental 
behavior. To illustrate, language in the form of casual conversation 
may be considered from a biological standpoint as not adaptive at 
all, while language in the form of instructions or commands may 
be thought of as indirectly adaptive from the same standpoint. In 
general, we might name the two degrees of indirect action (1) 
mediative and (2) referential language. The criterion for distinction 
is the closeness to a direct response, the referential being the 
farthest removed. And so we might consider as referential all the 
language behavior which we call ordinary conversation and the 
exclamatory reactions which substitute for direct reactions. Now 
although it is true that in the case of some referential behavior a 
direct reaction to a stimulus is out 
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of the question, in the sense that it need never occur, as for 
example casual conversation, still the criterion of indirectness is 
just as valid in such cases as when some direct reaction is possible. 
Under the division of mediative behavior we can place all the 
language reactions which are in some form or other connected with 
direct reactions, that is, those responses which are instrumental in 
provoking direct action or closely associated with it. 
Since in practice language responses may be said to be related 
to direct action in four ways, namely, they may precede, 
accompany, follow, or substitute for direct action, it may serve to 
illustrate the indirect character of language reactions to discuss 
briefly the four different ways in which language behavior 
operates. We will find that the language responses that precede, 
accompany, or follow direct action belong under the mediative 
heading, while the substituting type of language reactions we will 
call referential, in that it need not bear directly upon any direct 
action. 
(a) Language as Preceding Reactions.—Various forms of 
preceding language responses may be isolated. A very clear-cut 
case is that in which language is used to induce some one to 
perform a direct action upon some object. Here we have the 
ordinary case of instructional or directing language. We may call 
this a practical or instrumental use of language. In other cases our 
preceding language may be the overt or expressed wish, hope, or 
plan to perform some action with respect to some stimulus object 
or situation. While for theoretical purposes there is no difference 
between this expressive type of language and instrumental speech, 
in our practical circumstances their variations turn out to be quite 
significant. And this is true whether or not the preceding indirect 
language act is or is not followed by direct action. In case the 
direct action does not occur or in case there is a definite certainty 
that it will not occur we must place this preceding act in the class 
of referential language. 
(b) Language as Accompanying Reactions.—To illustrate 
language as accompanying or simultaneously occurring indirect 
reactions we may take the case of responding to a 
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picture by way of admiration or contempt and at the same time 
voicing or otherwise expressing or indicating what our direct 
response to this object is. Here of course the direct response may 
be the person's own thought or feeling responses which are 
accompanied by language expression. 
(c) Language as Following Reactions.—What in many cases 
is very close to accompanying reactions may actually be indirect 
following responses and which may be very definitely determined 
by preceding direct responses. Exemplified are succeeding indirect 
responses in the act of telling someone what effect some object or 
situation has had upon one. The student who imparts to one of his 
companions the pangs he suffered during an examination is 
performing definitely succedent indirect reactions which are quite 
different from those indirect reactions which we assume to have 
accompanied the actual taking of the examination. To sing by way 
of glorifying, or bewailing what has happened are also indirect 
succedent responses. Of these succedent responses a large number 
may be subsumed under the heading of reference language 
reactions. 
(d) Language as Substitute Reactions.—Let the reader observe 
that as a matter of fact our four conditions of indirect action 
resolve themselves into two general conditions. Indirect action (1) 
associated with (preceding, accompanying or following) other 
responses and indirect action (2) substituted for direct action. Our 
three aforementioned language types, as we stated in the 
beginning, belong of course under the first or associational heading 
and now we must illustrate indirect responses which substitute for 
or replace direct action. Substitutional language does not influence 
or need not necessarily have any influence at all on any direct 
action, nor on the other hand need such language itself be 
influenced by direct action, while in the associative type of 
language there may be such an influence. As an example of 
substitute reaction we may take the case of the person who, instead 
of rushing in to a burning building to rescue a child, may just 
exclaim in a variety of ways what he sees. 
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The indirectness of language responses as we have been 
attempting to establish it, can be very readily and very 
convincingly observed during the formation of language habits by 
the infant.1 The observer must be struck with the differences 
between the language responses and the necessities and desires of 
the infant as well as with the specific responses of the infant in 
satisfying those wants or of the person who aids in their 
accomplishment.2 The indirectness of the reactions can perhaps no 
better be established than by the reflection upon the numerous 
ways in which the language reaction can be carried out, especially 
if we consider the different language reactions of different groups 
and the varying language responses of the members of any given 
group. 
Lest our emphasis of the indirectness of language reactions be 
thought too persistent we proffer the defensive suggestion that 
because our task here is that of definitely marking off one type of 
psychological response from other sorts of psychological behavior, 
we cannot be too exact in our descriptions. Especially is this true 
since not only are language reactions, like all other psychological 
phenomena, specific responses to particular stimuli, but they are 
not always morphologically different from other types of behavior. 
Of a surety when we think of verbal responses as language we 
cannot make many mistakes in differentiating what is, from "what 
is not language, but just as surely must we realize that verbal 
responses are not by far the only kinds of language reaction nor are 
indeed verbal reactions always language activities.3 
More essential still does it appear to us to specify what are the 
differences between language and other psychological behavior 
because we summarily reject those traditional con- 
1 See Watson's excellent description, 'Behavior,' 1914, p. 329 ff. 
2  It is for this reason no doubt that Watson calls language reactions substitute 
responses, cf. 'Behavior,' 1914, p. 329 ff; 'Psychology,' 1919, p. 319 ff. We do not 
believe that substitution is a general characteristic of language reactions although 
such a description fits some language types. 
3  For example, naming an object may no more be a language reaction than look-
ing at it for all the laryngeal processes involved. 
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ceptions of language which make it, from a psychological 
standpoint, into either (1) mental states called meanings, which are 
transferred from one mind to another, or which are aroused in one 
mind by another through the medium of speech, or into (2) verbal 
or other physical manifestations of various sorts of mental states. 
From our objective psychological standpoint language cannot in 
any sense be considered to be a series of ideas or the expression or 
communication of ideas or other mental states. 
To conceive of language as definite behavior phenomena not 
only gives us a much closer approach to the actual workings of 
such facts but it also enables us to include under the category of 
language, and to provide descriptions of, many sorts of specific 
adaptations that would otherwise be excluded. As to the first point, 
consider that we avoid completely such embarrassing problems as 
how it is possible for the same physical material (sound waves or 
light waves) to produce such different effects as do sensory and 
verbal stimuli.1 Such problems the mentalist must face because he 
takes the media of stimulation such as light rays and air waves to 
be the stimuli themselves and so he must struggle to find a way out 
of this inexplicable situation. 
When we think in terms of specific reactions to particular 
stimuli, whether persons, objects or events, we cannot subject 
ourselves to such insoluble enigmas. On the other hand, by 
rejecting the conception of language as an external manifestation 
of some kind of thought process we remove the necessity of 
limiting language action to such behavior as can be called 
intellectual or cognitive. All language need not fall under some 
sort of cognitive category as is the case when the declarative 
sentence is presumed to be the typical language function. By the 
same token language cannot be made into exclusive emotional or 
feeling expressions nor yet into expressions of merely the two 
kinds of states or experiences. Most serviceably and most validly 
must language reactions be considered as just such behavior 
phenomena as they happen to be, depending upon the way the 
stimulating 
1  Such a problem is raised by Warren, 'Human Psychology,' 1919, p. 321. 
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situations condition them. From this standpoint the language 
reactions may be named in any way esteemed suitable by the 
consideration of the behavior situations in which they operate. 
With a myriad voices, though with no intention at all has 
philological science as well as popular thought celebrated the 
indirectness of language reactions. This characterization of 
indirectness has been achieved by looking upon language 
responses and their graphic representations as symbols of 
meanings and as indicators of concepts or ideas. To us it is 
manifest that no matter what view we take concerning the nature 
of concepts or ideas we must consider them as forms of implicit or 
incipient processes. For our own part, of course, meanings, ideas, 
and concepts are also definite forms of psychological responses. 
That philological science and popular thought do not intentionally 
make language into indirect behavior we say, because as a matter 
of fact the symbolic character of language does not lie in any 
reference to mental or psychic processes as popular psychology 
would have it, but rather in the instrumental or mediative function 
of language responses. Not all language is meaning behavior, but it 
is true that an exceedingly large amount of our language reactions 
serve as means or instruments for bringing about or for carrying on 
other types of action or otherwise accomplishing our purposes; so 
that the referential or indirect character of language has been 
generally observed and recorded. 
How such observations were made we may infer from the fact 
that when anyone speaks of things or events not present, or asks 
someone to do something, he must surely note that his action is 
indirect and referential with respect to the absent thing or the thing 
the other person acts upon. Were it generally appreciated that ideas 
and concepts are merely implicit reactions to stimuli, that is to say, 
actual responses, then it might be overtly appreciated that language 
constitutes indirect reactions connected with concepts and ideas as 
direct responses to the same stimuli objects. But whether concepts, 
meanings and ideas are properly or im- 
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properly defined in popular psychology, the very fact that they are 
connected with language indicates clearly that language is fairly 
universally recognized to be indirect behavior, especially when the 
popular view concerning ideas and meanings are correctly 
interpreted, which means for us interpreted as definite behavior 
acts. 
But here a very important problem presents itself, namely, the 
connection of language and ideational or thought processes. How 
are these processes in fact related? Are they perhaps identical? 
Such an identity indeed suggests itself through the circumstance 
that both thought and language are mediate activities. Recently 
this identification has been very strenuously urged in an attempt to 
show that thoughts (concepts, ideas) are not mental substances or 
psychic processes. Certainly from an objective psychological 
standpoint thought cannot be considered as anything but 
adaptational responses to stimuli. Because of the close relation and 
apparent similarity between thought and language it will add 
greatly to our understanding of language to compare it with 
thought processes and if it is not identical with it to mark it off 
definitely from thinking. To the study of this relation between the 
two kinds of behavior we devote the next division of our study. 
IV. Distinction between Language and Thought.—That 
thought and language cannot be identified must appear a most 
valid conclusion to anyone who reflects a moment upon the actual 
behavior types which are represented by these two psychological 
terms. Consider that the term thought covers a large range of 
psychological activities, such as planning, problem-solving, 
judging, evaluating, inferring, etc. Can anyone meaningfully assert 
that these forms of complex reactions are language responses 
much as we may employ language behavior (though perhaps no 
more than all other sorts together) in accomplishing such 
responses? Only a moment's reflection is sufficient to recall most 
convincingly that the various forms of thinking involve so many 
and such peculiar contacts with stimuli objects of all sorts, and 
with instruments for handling them, that it is impossible to 
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call all such reactions language or even apply the term language to 
the typical phases of such activities. 
In short, to call thinking language means rashly to overlook all 
the myriads of differences in the behavior situations. To name only 
one fact, is not language most typically, though obviously not 
exclusively, responses to persons as stimuli, but who would say 
that our thinking need necessarily have any close reference to 
persons or human affairs? Possibly one might be misled by the 
great place which printed and written materials play in our 
complex thinking and planning in the form of notes and records. 
To make the use of these verbal notes a basis for confusing 
thought and language is a grievous error. In the first place, what 
right have we to confuse verbal tools used in the process of 
thinking with that process or action, any more than we have to 
identify with thought itself any other tool (of which obviously 
there exists a great many) used in thinking. And in the second 
place, such a confusion of the records of thought with the activity 
of thinking itself is to mistake word symbols (which are no more 
language than any other sort of symbols) for the actual 
psychological process of language. 
No one can deny that language is a most useful tool for the 
operation and development of our thinking; yet we must be so 
impressed with the fact that there are other modes of action which 
can be used in the planning, inferring and other thinking acts that 
we perform, that we cannot in any sense admit any general identity 
between language and thought. Even if we should admit, as we do 
without hesitation, that in some cases (perhaps not rare instances) 
the thinking and planning is purely linguistic (vocal or non-vocal, 
overt or implicit) we yet cannot allow the general identification, 
because thinking and planning may just as well consist of other 
kinds of reactions as well as words, or other kinds of language. 
Now as a matter of fact, in all cases of important or crucial 
thinking we have, since such behavior is initiated by and operates 
under the auspices of very complex situations, a host of reactions 
occurring, some of which may 
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be language responses,  but certainly include others which 
are not. 
If it seems plausible at all to believe that thinking is not 
language, even when we add that it is not always nor necessarily 
so, then we might see further ground for rejecting the 
identification from the fact that certainly language operates along 
with, or in the service of other forms of adapta-tional behavior, 
besides thought. For instance, in communication we use language 
to inform others of what we desire, hope, fear, and do (in the form 
of overt action) as well as to make known what we think. 
Assuming that we agree that we cannot identify thought and 
language responses because each of these classes of behavior 
refers to what are on the whole intrinsically different adaptational 
functions, then of necessity the two types of behavior are different 
in the specific way that they operate. Unlike language responses 
thinking reactions are direct adaptations to stimuli, although some 
form of thought action, especially simple implicit behavior, 
appears to be indirect. It is this fact of the misconstrued 
indirectness of thinking behavior (since there are a great many of 
the apparent indirect types of thinking) which no doubt is in great 
part responsible for the identification of language and thought. In 
three general ways, then, can thinking acts appear indirect, each of 
which we must examine in turn in order to determine the exact 
relation of thought to language. 
1. Because much of our thinking represents delayed forms of 
behavior, that is to say, because many specific reaction systems 
operate in conjunction with a number of different stimuli 
comprising the different angles of the thinking stimulus or 
situation, these specific responses may appear as indirect, but such 
is in fact not the case. Let us examine the possible reasons for such 
a misapprehension. In the case of thinking behavior there is 
present a temporal and spatial element involved in the complex 
action of responding to the various stimuli provoking the thinking 
response. The hit or miss character of thinking implies such a 
condition. For instance, a man determining in which of many 
manners he 
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can best ford a stream must probably make several movements or 
take several moments to decide upon the best way of doing it, but 
his reactions to these various stimuli are purely direct. On the 
contrary, in language behavior the one or the very few acts 
comprising the segment of action will all be indirect actions as we 
have indicated in the preceding section. The temporal disparity 
between stimulus and response which in thinking behavior 
provokes the opinion that such action is indirect when it is really 
direct, is wholly lacking in language behavior where the action is 
always indirect. 
2. Again, thinking reactions may appear indirect through the 
fact that when they are most serviceable as adjustment responses 
they operate as precurrent thinking or planning reactions. Such 
reactions pave the way for a later reaction which will result in 
some definite change in the condition or existence of the 
adjustment stimulus object. The point is that thinking either 
precedes an overt action in the sense that the planning and 
deciding are accomplished before any actual work is done upon 
the objects and events with reference to which the thinking was 
done, or in a single segment of behavior the thought as a 
precurrent reaction system precedes the occurrence of the final or 
end reaction which it indeed conditions. In many cases, too, the 
characteristic of indirectness is attributed to thought reactions 
because no overt act at all need follow the implicit behavior. Our 
present interest is to point out that the implicit activity preceding 
overt action is in truth a direct response to the adjustment stimulus 
but because this reaction has to be aroused through the 
intervention of a substitute stimulus the immediate reaction must 
be thinking or implicit activity. But notice, that when the thinking 
or implicit reaction occurs, no matter how long before the overt 
act, it is itself a direct, though non-explicit response to the original 
or substituted-for object or situation. 
In the case of language, on the contrary, our study has shown 
us that the adjustment stimulus object may be present and 
frequently is, when the language response is made, but the reaction 
to that object is referential and not direct.   This 
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is true because the final response can only be made through the 
means of an auxiliary stimulus. At this point it seems only fair to 
admit that possibly our term indirect does not fit language 
responses any better than it is suitable for thought reactions, but 
there is no question concerning the fact of difference in the two 
cases irrespective of what name is employed to express that 
difference. 
In the attempt further to elucidate the differences between the 
actual indirectness of language reactions and the apparent 
indirectness of thinking reactions it might not be impermissible to 
digress a moment in order to point out that although the temporal 
relationship of stimulus and response is not a criterion of indirect 
behavior still it is evident that the various instances of indirect 
reactions (language) may be differently conditioned by the 
temporal relation of response and adjustment stimulus. That is to 
say, the degree of indirectness depends upon whether the indirect 
language response follows a direct response or an implicit 
response. If language is associated with an implicit response the 
degree of directness or indirectness with respect to the adjustment 
stimulus will be greater than if it follows an overt reaction. As we 
have just stated it so happens that in most cases of implicit 
behavior the adjustment stimulus is responded to through the 
mediation of a substitute stimulus other than the adjustment object, 
and thus it happens that when an indirect language response 
follows an implicit action the person is doubly removed from the 
adjustment stimulus. This means, then, that in this instance there is 
a greater temporal interval between the connection of the language 
act and the adjustment stimulus than in the cases in which the 
language acts follow overt responses. If we may call any language 
response a response of second intention, then possibly it will not 
be unfitting to call a language response associated with an implicit 
reaction a reaction of third intention. Possibly an illustration might 
assist in clarifying this analysis. A person burns himself on a hot 
iron and his immediate and first response is a withdrawal act 
(reflex). Immediately following the reflex act he makes some 
language 
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responses (indirect) expressive of the pain he suffered. In this case 
the language activity follows an overt act (reflex) and is thus a 
language response of second intention. Later, this same person 
recalling the incident (implicit activity) communicates the details 
to his friend, or in other words performs a language response of 
third intention, since it follows the implicit activity of recalling the 
act of burning himself. 
3. Possibly the most potent influence for identifying language 
and thought arises from the fact that thought is made identical with 
implicit action and especially because there obviously exists 
implicit language.1 Now certainly some of our thought behavior 
may be considered to be merely implicit action, and patently 
language reactions are as much subject to implicit performance as 
any other sort of reaction, but these facts themselves contain 
arguments for not identifying thought and language. For observe 
that only a part of our thought behavior is merely implicit action, 
and furthermore, we have no more right to make implicit language 
synonomous with thought than any of the numerous other types of 
implicit action all of which may just as well as language be 
considered as thought. Moreover, as we shall presently see, 
implicit language cannot be considered as genuine language 
activity, and so while we might think of such reactions as thought 
we cannot think of them as language. 
Now although implicit language must be considered to be non-
problem-solving thought we cannot take such a fact to be 
indicative of the identity of language and thinking, since implicit 
language would be very little if at all serviceable for problem 
solving or any other active thinking process. In fact, it is possibly 
only in dreaming (day or night) that we perform implicit language 
activity to any extent and we need hardly comment on the striking 
contrast between such passive activity and the more active process 
of thinking. In all other cases than dreaming we can accomplish 
many things 
1 Is it not this shifting from thinking as problem-solving, to thinking as implicit 
action which lies at the basis of Watson's identification of thought and language? 
Cf. Brit. J. of Psychol., 1920, 2, 89, et passim. 
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and more useful ones through the means of implicit non-language 
reactions (implicit construction, purchasing, etc.). 
Granting that language functions most typically and most 
serviceably as psychological behavior when it is most overt, while 
thought as implicit behavior can be most serviceable to the person 
and operate most typically when there is a minimum of overt 
activity,1 then we may find in this fact a further basis for disbelief 
in the identity of thought and language. We are convinced that 
language most useful for thinking must be overt activity, an 
instrument for contact with things, the actual handling of materials 
and not the pale reflection of conversation. It is really because of 
the overt character of language on the one hand, and the implicit 
character of thinking on the other, and not because they are 
identical, that overt language and implicit responses are so 
frequently operating in combination—so frequently, in fact, that it 
is even thought that they cannot operate separately. They cannot 
operate separately, it is said, in the sense that we cannot think 
without language, a statement, by the way, which may well be true 
in practice, but which carries with it no implication of inflexible 
necessity.2 But at any rate, if it is true that language is more typical 
when overt, and much more useful for thought when so operating, 
then it is almost obvious that we cannot identify the two. 
1Here we must distinguish between implicit action of any sort considered as 
thought, and implicit thinking. The latter, of course, because of the absence of any 
adequate stimuli, is about as ineffective a form of action as we can well imagine. 
Brooding and dreaming are examples in point. No one of course will confuse such 
implicit thinking with thought that goes on in terms of implicit action, say implicit 
military operation, even though the latter can be contrasted with thinking in overt 
terms, as in the setting up of a complex original scientific apparatus. 
2 0tis, Arthur S., 'Do We Think in Words,' PSYCHOL. REV., 1920, 37, 339-449, 
has excellently described a number of situations in which thinking is doubtless a 
distinct process from verbal language. While this author may not have successfully 
combated Watson's view which he attacks, because the latter does not limit his linguistic 
thought actions to verbal responses, we still believe that thinking, whether problem-
solving or merely implicit action is not the same kind of psychological phenomenon 
as language. Perhaps it will not be considered too presumptuous of us to believe 
that, in view of our total rejection of any but an organismic hypothesis of thinking 
activity, Watson may not disagree with our practical functional distinction between 
thinking and language. 
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Provided that it is granted us that implicit behavior constitutes 
direct action to stimuli, may we not say that a clear distinction 
between thought and language is established ? And yet we must 
not be too sanguine of the validity of our argument. Those who still 
hold that thinking is implicit action may say, "But by implicit 
action in the discussion of language we mean sub-vocal behavior." 
Now sub-vocal behavior from the standpoint of our present 
objective position is of course indirect. Consequently, can it not be 
argued that thought as implicit or sub-vocal language behavior is 
therefore indirect and can be justifiably identified with language? 
We will immediately reply: Even accepting sub-vocal language 
responses as true language behavior, their functions in common 
with language in general, are usually quite different from thinking 
as we have already seen, and further, they need not in fact always 
be true functional language responses. Certainly when they are 
merely sub-vocally uttered words they seem to be purely 
conventional symbols. On the other hand, if one insists that sub-
vocal actions are not considered true language but merely taken to 
be implicit action, then, as we have already argued, we have no 
more right to identify such implicit language responses with 
thought than we have to identify any of the other very numerous 
types of implicit action with thought. As a matter of fact, from our 
standpoint sub-vocal language reactions are not normally implicit 
actions but overt responses of expressive form.1 In order to clear 
up this problem of what actually constitutes implicit behavior we 
might turn at this point to the consideration of such reactions. 
Preferably let us compare implicit action with actual language 
responses. 
Implicit reactions comprise incipient or other forms of actually 
direct responses to objects which result in no immediate change of 
condition or existence in the stimulus object. Let us notice that the 
most typical forms of implicit reactions are partial or vestigial 
remnants of originally larger or complete reactions as is 
excellently exemplified in the partially implicit visual-perceptual 
reaction which may be considered 
1 See below the distinction between expressive and communicative language. 
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as the seeing part or phase, or remainder of the original seeing-
touching or other whole l reaction system. The distinction, then, 
between an implicit and explicit reaction is a functional one. In 
other words, an implicit act may be morphologically exactly like 
an overt act, but owing to the absence of the original stimulus 
object no effect is produced upon that object. Now it happens that 
because of the absence of the original object, or because first 
contacts with objects produce disruptive and inhibitory conditions, 
the later contacts with the same objects consist of modified 
reaction systems. These partial or totally implicit reaction systems 
take on their specific character of implicitness because of the 
person's mode of contact with the stimulus in question and not in 
any sense because of their non-visibility or lack of openness to the 
inspection of the acting person or someone else. 
In this fact of the interpendence of response and stimulus, 
which of course is an inherently psychological phenomenon, we 
find the differentiating conditions which not only mark off overt 
from implicit behavior but also supply us with criteria for 
distinguishing one kind of implicit behavior from another. Thus 
when the original stimulus object is present in its customary setting 
we react to it in the same overt way as usual unless some 
interfering condition arises. When the original object is partially 
present, as when we can see but not touch it, then we perform a 
partially implicit response. When the object is entirely absent and 
we are made to respond to it through a substitution stimulus we 
have or may have an implicit action which is totally different from 
the original act though definitely derived from it. In case the same 
stimulus object substitutes for itself, which is a common 
occurrence as when a person makes us think of an experience we 
had with him some time ago, the resulting form of implicit action 
can be clearly made out to be a result of responding to the person 
in a previous setting through stimulation of the person in a present 
setting.    In 
1 Different, we should perhaps say here, instead of whole, because every unit of 
reaction is a reaction system. 
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similar fashion, if we keep in mind the relation of stimulus and 
response we can differentiate between feeling reactions and other 
types of both implicit and overt behavior. While the stimulus 
object is present in the case of feeling responses the reaction 
systems consist of the mild or vigorous agitation of the person 
himself without directly producing any change in the stimulus 
object or in the person's relation to that object. Of course we have 
implicit feeling reactions and here the response is a vestigial 
remnant of the original reaction system induced by a substitution 
stimulus. 
Implicit action, we may say, then, seems indirect because the 
original stimulus object is not present, or is not present in the same 
setting; but in either case, as we have previously made clear, the 
response has a direct adaptive bearing upon the adjustment 
stimulus. Our assumption is that implicit behavior constitutes 
direct adaptive responses in much the same way as the more 
striking cases of inhibition responses compose direct adaptive 
behavior. Contrariwise, in the case of typical language the action 
is overt and results or may result in some change in condition or 
existence of the stimulus, but the reaction is indirect because it is 
referential. Illustrative of such a situation is the operation of instru-
mental language responses. 
Once more we may return to the distinguishing criterion 
between thought as implicit action, and language, bringing to bear 
upon the problem the facts concerning the relationship of stimulus 
and response. We suggest that while implicit responses are 
mediate and secondary reactions, that is to say, involve two forms 
of stimulation as do indirect language reactions, the contacts of the 
person with those stimuli in the two cases are so different that we 
must consider the respective actions to belong to different types of 
behavior. Differences in action and name between direct and 
indirect responses are due to the difference in character of the 
additional stimuli. Now what is the exact difference between the 
two kinds of additional stimuli? Our assumption is that implicit 
behavior is always a direct adaptation in spite of the fact that for 
its performance is required a 
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substitute or additional stimulus. We call the additional stimulus 
substitutive because its only function is to call out the reaction to 
the adjustment stimulus, while the response is always made to the 
adjustment stimulus. Quite different is the auxiliary stimulus in 
language reactions which must operate along with and in 
synchronous addition to the adjustment stimulus. It is a genuine 
auxiliary stimulus operating as an integral factor in the total 
language activity. Furthermore we might even suggest that 
because in the case of implicit reactions the second stimulus 
merely substitutes for the adjustment stimulus, namely the thing or 
situation reacted to, there is really but one stimulus, while in the 
case of indirect or language reactions there are always two stimuli 
for any specific reaction system. We have no hesitation, then, in 
asserting that language is not identical with thought, either when 
thought is considered as planning or problem-solving or when 
thought is made into merely implicit behavior. 
Further evidence and of another sort, to establish the non-
identity of language and implicit action or thought may be 
deduced from the following consideration, to wit, that the two 
types of action as responses to the same set of stimuli may 
definitely parallel each other without any sort of interference or 
conflict. Moreover is it not true that we can think of something 
beyond and entirely different from the thing or circumstance of 
which we are speaking, a condition which would be impossible if 
the two types of action were identical, since the person may be 
employing all of his language or thinking structures and 
mechanisms for performing one of the two simultaneously 
occurring forms of response? 
Still another fact militates against our identification of 
language and thought (as implicit action). It is this, that our 
language reactions as far as their actual mode of operation is 
concerned are definitely acquired through social stimulation, 
whereas our implicit actions, though they may be symbolized, are 
to a great extent merely functions of our individual contacts with 
our surroundings. This individuality of response, it may be argued, 
is not any more true of thought 
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than it is of language, for thought is also socially conditioned, but 
here the question arises whether we are not shifting our discussion 
from mere implicit action to the more complex forms of activity, 
namely, planning, or problem solving. 
Neither thinking nor implicit action, then, is identical with 
language activity, and further, even if we agree that language is not 
inseparable from thought must we still say that language is the sole 
medium for the expression of thought or the actualization of 
implicit action?1 Unhesitatingly we answer 'no,' and especially if 
by asking the question it is meant in any sense to establish any 
peculiar relationship between thought or implicit action and 
language responses. That thought need not be exclusively 
actualized through language is evident from the fact that because 
thinking is planning or problem-solving the expression of the 
reaction would doubtless occur in the form of actual overt 
responses made by way of changing some object or circumstance. 
Similarly, implicit action, being non-effective immediate action, 
would most likely have for its expression the actual initiation of 
some behavior affecting the previously absent and substituted for 
object which now has become available. Of a certainty, conditions 
are different in situations in which no final overt action is 
contemplated or possible, and in these situations the actualization 
of the thought or implicit action will be achieved through the 
medium of language. Possibly it may be objected that what we 
have referred to as actualization of thought is not what is usually 
meant by expression of thought, but what is meant by expression is 
rather communication or telling someone of what was thought. 
Certainly the communication of thought, although a very frequent 
form of human action, does not occur with such constancy 
considering the total number of possible cases of thought action as 
to make any thoroughgoing concomitancy possible. Very much of 
the thought of the world is set down in writing or expressed by 
word of mouth, but not 
1 'Expression of thought' is a faulty term, implying as it does the embodiment 
of a psychic stuff or process. When properly used it refers to the employment of 
language or other action during the act of thinking or informing someone of what 
thinking action we have been engaged in. 
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all of it by far, nor perhaps half of it. As a matter of fact language 
being the typical form of indirect or referential behavior we can 
readily employ it in referring to our thought reactions as well as to 
all other sorts of actions and things. When communication occurs 
we must admit that we cannot conceive of any behavior that is in 
any sense nearly so effective for the purpose as is language. 
Before concluding our discussion we might ask why should 
psychologists attempt to establish an identity or inseparable 
relation between thought and language? We believe the answer to 
lie in the suggestion that such an attempt is made in order to make 
thought a definite mode of psychological reaction and not an 
indefinite form of mental stuff or process. Admirable as is the 
motive for this identification and much as we approve of the 
attempt to bring psychological facts out of the clouds of 
unverifiable assertion, we must still withhold our assent from such 
an identifying procedure in the interests of other facts. What are 
the other facts? Briefly, all those complex and interesting 
developments and operation of the exceedingly effective indirect 
forms of psychological adaptation which we call language. 
V. Modes of Language Reactions.—Because of the multiplicity 
of occasions for language adjustments and the consequent 
differences in their variety it is essential to provide some 
descriptive definiteness and order for such reactions. Two tasks 
especially here confront us. The first is to mark off what are actual 
language reactions from behavior which may closely resemble 
language and yet not be language. And secondly, we must 
distinguish between totally different modes of definitely 
established language reactions, for in failing to do this we might 
exclude from our enumeration of the facts of language authentic 
language reactions, as would be the case for example were we to 
confine language to merely verbal speech. 
1. Morphological and Functional Language.—And first we 
must point out that upon a functional basis only can we 
accomplish our first classifactory purposes, namely to separate off 
language from non-language behavior.    Even where we 
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find behavior which is morphologically similar to other kinds of 
unmistakable language activities we must with hold from it the 
appellation of language unless it serves a language function. To put 
it differently, it must serve as indirect reactions or adjustments. 
Suppose I wish to have my typewriter operate more smoothly but 
cannot make the necessary changes myself; I must let my wishes 
be known to someone who is able to do it. My psychological 
adaptation is made by means of verbal speech or by pointing. 
In contrast to this definite functional operation of language 
behavior it may happen that I may utter perfectly formed words or 
perform other genuinely linguistic reactions which will not at all 
serve as instrumental or even indirect adjust-mental acts. These 
then we will exclude from the domain of functional language. An 
example would be the words we utter as replacement reactions in 
emotional situations. Along with the large number of reflexes 
which replace the absent final reaction system in emotional 
behavior segments we may utter words, mere verbalizations that 
are really acquired reflexes, which, owing to the fundamentally 
non-adjustmental character of emotional reactions, no more adapt 
the person to his surroundings than do the reflexes.1 
Again, the use of words by infants in imitation of bits of 
conversation overheard also illustrates what is perfect language 
morphologically, but what at the same time is not an the least 
language functionally. It is possible also that words and phrases 
used by dissociated and otherwise abnormal persons 
(verbigeration) may exemplify morphological similarities to 
language responses but are certainly not themselves such behavior. 
When we turn to other than verbal language reactions the 
criteria between language and other forms of behavior cannot be 
so well made out, since there is not the sharp division there 
between morphology and function that there is in the case of vocal 
language reactions. But since we assume the criterion of language 
to be the question whether the person performs an indirect 
response we   can  at least 
1 Cf. Kantor, 'A Naturalistic Description of Emotions,' PSYCHOL. REV., 1921, 
28,19-42,120-140. 
AN ANALYSIS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL LANGUAGE DATA       293 
specify what are not language responses. For example, we can 
distinguish the true language reactions of the infant from its 
random acts that may be only morphologically language, if 
language at all. Thus the crying act of an infant may be considered 
both as a definite indirect action serving to communicate to 
someone its uncomfortable situation or as expressive of some such 
discomforting condition, but on the other hand the crying may be, 
from the language standpoint, purely random actions along with 
many other sorts of infant behavior which are merely indicative of 
superabundant energy. 
And here an important suggestion surges in upon our 
exposition. In the form of a question it is this: what can we say of 
implicit language behavior, since by becoming implicit such 
behavior loses its function of indirect overt adjustment? To this 
query we can only answer that we must accept the dictates of hard 
facts and agree that implicit language is not language, precisely as 
we say that spending money implicitly or partaking of a meal 
implicitly is not spending or eating. In our opinion we cannot 
avoid this conclusion much as we may consent to the proposition 
that implicit language reactions are morphologically just like 
definitely overt language responses. 
To balance, as it were, this exclusion from the domain of 
language of a whole class of psychological reactions we must 
propose the unqualified inclusion of interjectional reactions in the 
realm of language. Especially is this inclusion to be urged in view 
of the fact that philologists either exclude or attempt to exclude 
interjections from language phenomena or else they tend to 
minimize the importance of such behavior. Why they do this is 
plain, since interjections are not conventionalized as are other 
forms of language. From the standpoint of reactions, however, 
such behavior answers as definitely and as effectively to the 
criteria of language behavior as any other sort of language 
reactions. To be more succinct, interjectional language reactions 
function as means or instruments to express the conditions of the 
person induced in him by various surrounding persons and events. 
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2. Expressive and Communicative Language.—Within the 
field of functional language, that is to say, definite language 
reactions, we may introduce a distinction of great importance; we 
may divide language into two large divisions, to each of which we 
may apply a distinctive term or name, to wit, expressive and 
communicative language. 
(a) Expressive.—In general, we might characterize expressive 
language behavior by indicating that it comprises the individual's 
adjustment to stimuli which do not necessarily involve any 
relationship to another person. Expressive language reactions we 
may look upon, therefore, as in a sense the most illustrative of our 
indirect responses, since the exclusion of persons removes the 
possibility of a connection between language and any direct 
adjustment. But observe that when the reaction results in leaving a 
record, such a record may become a stimulus for some direct 
action on the part of the person and in consequence the original 
action may be considered as connected with a direct action. To 
illustrate, as I react favorably to a painting in an exhibition I 
express my admiration by writing 'wonderful' opposite the 
catalogue number of the painting. This expression may become a 
stimulus for my friend to purchase the picture. 
Is it not easy to see that expressive language better illustrates 
indirectness of response because of the passivity of the reacting 
individual? Expressive language activity is more of the nature of 
self-recording behavior, the registration of how some object, event 
or person has affected us or how we should like or hope to have an 
event turn out, etc. Contrariwise, the communicative language 
reaction may take place through any number of intermediate 
persons as is illustrated by the passage of an order down through an 
ecclesiastical or military hierarchy. Certainly we can no better put 
the matter in hand than to say that expressive language actions 
stand as responses only; they do not serve as stimuli for other 
persons as is the case with at least some of the communicative 
language reactions. 
Indirect, expressive language certainly is, but still it may 
involve the elaborate employment of tools or instruments 
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(pen, picture) for its production, but here the instruments would be 
employed entirely to further the process of expression and not to 
effect some change in the adjustment stimulus object or to 
communicate in others the desire for such a change. 
In all of this discussion let the reader beware, we are not using 
the term expression in the sense of a verbal or gestural 
manifestation of a mental state. Such a warning is doubtless 
superfluous from the standpoint of our exposition but the 
mentalistic way of looking at the matter is so prevalent that we 
cannot too frequently assert our departure from that tradition. 
In quite another sense must we guard against a misconstruction 
concerning expressive language, namely, the idea that it expresses 
or is especially connected with emotions. In some sense this view 
is intimately associated with the general idea that language is the 
expression of mental states, for here it is assumed that an emotion 
is the mental state expressed. Now the patent reply to such a view 
is to assert that by means of expressive language the person 
performs actions involving what we may call ideas, desires, hopes 
as well as performing reactions that adjust him indirectly to events 
past, present or future. From the standpoint of the actual 
adjustmental situation expressive language is in no sense different 
from communicative language and in this statement we disagree 
with those who would make expressive language emotional as 
compared with communicative language which is assumed to be 
mainly or exclusively the expression of ideas. 
Turning to the morphological feature of expressive language 
reactions we might expect, because of the commonness of verbal 
behavior, that expressive language will consist to a great extent of 
verbal reactions. But as a matter of fact, in comparison with 
communicative language, typical expressive reactions consist to a 
considerable degree of gestures of various sorts, facial expressions, 
smirking, sneering, crying, smiling, laughing, etc. 
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(b) Communicative.—In contrast to expressive reactions 
communicative language involves adjustment to some other person 
or persons and consists to a considerable degree of intentional and 
substitutive responses designed to bring about some change of an 
informational or overtly active sort in that other person with 
respect to the adjustment stimulus object or condition. We might 
indicate at this point that the criterion of communication depends 
upon the behavior of the second person rather than any result 
achieved by the first or stimulating person. In plainer words, we 
have communicative language when the transmissive or the first 
person's language reaction actually serves as a stimulus to arouse a 
response language reaction in the recipient. It follows, then at this 
particular point that the different phases of communicative 
language must be determined exclusively with reference to directly 
observable activities actually accomplished; that is to say, we need 
not consult the intentions or refer to the purposes of either person 
in the communicative situation. It is not a question whether they 
intended their language response to be heard or otherwise 
responded to. But we do not mean to exclude from our 
observations the distinction in communicative reactions between 
language spontaneously addressed to another person and language 
induced in the addressing person by a question or command of 
another individual. In the former case we consider the indirect 
reaction to be initiated by the adjustment stimulus (the thing 
spoken of) which reaction is then also conditioned by the auxiliary 
stimulus, namely the addressed person. The latter case, on the 
contrary, exhibits a reaction started off by the auxiliary stimulus 
(the person giving the command) which later, comparatively 
speaking, connects up with the adjustment stimulus (the object 
reacted to in the carrying out of the command). It must be 
observed, however, that the purpose of the first person is not 
essential as a characterizing feature of instrumental communicative 
language, for it may well be that my conversational reactions in 
which I relate to my friend the incidents of my trip abroad will 
serve as an instrumental stimulus for him to take the trip. 
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Purposes and intentions of individuals with respect to the 
adjustment stimulus do however make possible within the domain 
of communicative language the distinction between conversation 
and instrumental speech. Conversational language is 
communicative speech in which the trans-missive individual is not 
planning any definite direct action with respect to the adjustment 
stimulus, while in instrumental communicative speech such a 
purpose and intention is manifest. That the purpose or intention 
refers to the changes with respect to the adjustment stimulus and 
not to the actions of the speaker is hardly necessary to make a 
point of. 
In suggesting examples of communicative language we might 
mention verbal speech, and possibly song and music, as well as 
gestures (pointing), printing, writing, telegraphy, signaling, of 
various sorts, etc. 
Poetry and other forms of literary production when considered 
as language reactions partake of both the expressive and 
communicative forms of language. As references to the esthetic 
adaptations of persons they are of course expressive reactions, but 
on the other hand they do serve to arouse reactions in other people 
in the sense that the language responses (poems, for instance) of 
the first person are at the same time communicative as well as 
expressive. These reactions as reactions may intentionally or 
unintentionally, but not accidentally, on the part of the reacting 
person inform the stimulated person of some fact or condition by 
means of some symbolic or instrumental, or at any rate, some 
indirect action. 
Receptive and Transmissive Communicative Reactions.— 
Very essential it is to distinguish within the field of com-
municative language behavior between the receptive and 
transmissive sorts of reactions, a distinction made imperative by 
the fact that communicative language is interactional, that is, it 
involves two persons. It may well be in many cases that we are 
speaking of exactly the same act or the same sort of action, but in 
the one case the actor communicates with some one, whereas in 
the other, someone is being 
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communicated with. Or we might say that in transmissive action 
the person's acts serve as stimuli to induce meaning reactions in a 
second person whose receptive action is at the same time a 
stimulus to the first person to perform a meaning action which 
again serves as a stimulus for the second, etc. In general, 
communicative language typifies the closest and most intensive 
interstimulation and interresponse activity. 
Among the (1) transmissive responses we may name for 
illustrative purposes, speaking, writing, making signs, gestures, 
etc., while among the (2) receptive language reactions we may 
include hearing and seeing responses of all sorts. 
As a final remark here it may be well to suggest that 
communicative language behavior is neither necessarily always 
more complex nor higher in the scale of human performances than 
the expressive language reactions. Quite the opposite, in fact, since 
some expressive language reactions such as poetry are by far as 
important as any kind of communicative behavior and certainly 
much more complex than most speech reactions. That this point is 
almost obvious is seen from the fact that much of the expressive 
action may be communicative as well as expressive. 
In summing up the psychological facts which fall definitely 
under the heading of language behavior we find a large series of 
reaction types beginning with shoulder shrugging and other forms 
of gesturing which grow by combination and integration out of 
non-language expressive and manipulative actions and run up to 
the most complex and elaborate forms of verbal speech behavior. 
VI. Types of Language Reaction Systems.—Not only can we 
differentiate between the various stimulus-response language 
situations as we did under the heading of modes, but we may also 
provide some arrangement of the vast amount of linguistic 
materials by classifying them according to the specific reaction 
systems involved. Naturally enough because of the similarities and 
overlappings in these reaction systems no hard and fast lines can 
be drawn between the different forms of language responses, still 
some order is 
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possible. Accordingly, we plan to arrange a series of classes of 
language-reaction systems, a series founded on the differences 
between communicative language and which cuts across the 
boundaries between communicative and expressive speech. We 
base our classification on the communicative type of speech on the 
ground that not only will a greater simplicity and definiteness be 
achieved, but also, because no form of language activity need be 
neglected since under communicative language is represented 
every form of language act. Our greatest line of differentiation 
then will be that between the transmissive and receptive modes of 
action. 
I. Primarily Transmissive Modes of Language, (a) Vocal 
Speech.1—Very prominent in the list of all language reactions we 
find of course vocal speech. Not only has this type of language 
been developed as the most prominent form of expressive and 
communicative adaptation, but such language reactions have 
become connected with and instrumental to some of the most 
complex behavior of which the human being is capable. Vocal 
speech is an integral factor in all of our voluntary and thinking 
action, as well as our general social conduct. Under this heading 
we may place all the behavior phenomena which can be subsumed 
under the rubric of speech or talking. 
In considering the graphic forms of sign and symbol making, 
that is to say writing and printing, we observe that a special virtue 
attaches to the fact that these reactions require an extension of the 
person's organic equipment for their performance. Not only can we 
thereby extend the scope of our immediate behavior as illustrated 
by the difference in transmitting information and other materials 
by word of mouth or gestures, but we also obtain thereby a more 
permanent record. It is not without the range of possibility that as 
Professor Warren2 suggests, "the chief role of graphic language is 
to extend the range of communication 
1 It is not intended that this list should be arranged in the order of the importance 
of the reactions involved, since even in the absence of an objective standard it must 
be conceded that written language in cultured groups hardly stands second in func-
tional value to vocal speech. 
2'Human Psychology,' p. 319. 
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in space and time." Think only of the information concerning 
ancient civilizations which the people of those times have supplied 
for us through the instrumentality of signs on bricks, clay tablets, 
monuments, etc. 
(b) Vocal Gesture.—The vocal apparatus of the human 
individual not only is the instrument for our fully developed 
speech reactions but also for the simpler vocal gesturing, such as 
calling, crying, whistling, sighing, grunting in infants, singing and 
other forms. Vocal gesturing, while ordinarily expressive language 
behavior, can also function as definitely communicative expressive 
language reactions. 
(c) Sub-vocal Speech.—Besides the overt and complete 
language behavior we have many kinds which are not audibly 
performed. Among such reactions are the silent speech and silent 
reading responses and more typically perhaps those language 
activities serving as phases of what are known as "mental" 
arithmetic, etc. By far the most of our complex behavior such as 
planning, brooding and various forms of thinking include many 
various forms of sub-vocal language. The student of language may 
well question whether these reactions may be considered as 
primarily transmissive, since we can very readily think of 
numerous instances in which they serve receptive functions, but in 
view of the fact that self-communication, in which they are 
transmissively employed, is so common, we include them here. 
(d) Non- Vocal Gesturing.—Much of our language behavior 
goes on in the form of gestures; in fact since under this rubric we 
include most of the language reactions not involving vocal or 
verbal behavior the field of gestures is very large. Such behavior 
comprises a great variety of forms; here we have deaf and dumb 
language, the shoulder shrugging, facial gesturing and the 
movements of various parts of the body, eyes, arms, hands, head, 
etc. 
Gestures are not only primary and exclusive language 
adaptations to various stimuli but they also function as adjunct 
responses along with other language reactions. Thus the motions 
of fingers, hands and arms, the shrugging of the shoulders and 
numerous sorts of facial expression may 
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constitute the more or less essential accompaniments of vocal 
speech. So important are such accompanying reactions in many 
cases that without them the vocal reactions carry little or no 
significance. A field experiment in this connection involves the 
observation of the degree of understanding which we derive from 
listening to conversation both when it is and when it is not 
accompanied by gestural responses. 
Possibly it is not beside the point to assert that gestural 
language represents almost every phase of human adjustment to 
stimuli. It may express and communicate thought, feeling, desire, 
the state of health, kind of disease, activity, and other forms of 
adjustment. By language gestures we perform almost every sort of 
adaptation that we can otherwise execute. 
(e) Making Signs and Symbols.—Very numerous are those 
language reactions requiring some extension of the organism's 
natural equipment for their execution. While vocal and bodily 
gesturing involve merely our own elaborate organismic equipment 
other forms of language behavior involve the use of instruments 
such as a pencil, pen, graver, pennants, type and paper, skins, 
stones, and other impressible materials as well as sound-making 
(telegraph) and other types of mediating tools. Such instruments 
are employed not only for our own personal activities but also for 
our complex social responses since the most important technical 
and scientific information can be intentionally conveyed by the use 
of such instrumental reactions. Most interesting is it to observe 
that the language reactions in which we employ tools for sign-
making are not in principle different from our complex verbal 
reactions. The latter also involve definite autonomous tools or 
instruments, that is to say, sound combinations or symbols. Are 
not the entire set of materials with which the philologist deals 
formal symbolic tools employed by specific groups of individuals 
as media of intercourse, tools which are modified and developed to 
suit their own specific needs? In comparing sign and symbol 
language with verbal responses we find the greatest difference to 
lie merely in the fact that the latter are performed exclusively with 
our own organismic 
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equipment. Examples of this sign-symbol class of language 
responses are writing, printing, picture drawing as in the case of 
the cave dweller, using codes of all varieties, stamps and flowers, 
also wigwagging and signaling of all sorts. 
While expressive language is not excluded from this type as 
witness the inclusion of picture and other forms of writing, these 
reactions on the whole serve to convey in a more formal manner 
than expressive behavior our ideas, wants, desires, etc. 
II. Primarily Receptive Reactions.—While as a matter of fact 
the receptive language reactions consist mainly of definite seeing 
and hearing responses we might generalize all of the 
characteristically receptive reactions and group them under the 
heading of understanding. In so doing we not only generalize all 
the specific reactions but we separate off the understanding 
reactions which are precurrent to or anticipatory of final language 
reactions from the latter. This separation is made possible 
primarily by the fact that in the majority of cases the seeing or 
hearing acts are precurrent understanding reactions which may 
accompany other precurrent acts of an implicit or partially implicit 
nature, while the end reactions in a language behavior segment are 
overt reactions. We might point out also that the justification for 
separating the understanding reactions from the rest of the 
behavior segment lies in the possibility it affords us of a better 
comprehension of the whole series of factors. 
Understanding responses are meaning reactions. That is to say, 
they function as means to the performance of some other act, and 
may be roughly said to consist of a realization or discrimination of 
the stimulus object or condition. This realization makes for an 
appropriate final response. The degree of realization ascribable to 
the meaning response depends upon whether the precurrent 
reactions in a behavior segment are or are not exclusively overt. 
As a matter of fact, the simplest sort of understanding reaction is 
one of which there is no discernible precurrent reaction at all but 
only the one overt reaction system. Such a case is illustrated by the 
incident in which pulling the hand away is practically 
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a part of the hearing of the admonition to "look out for the saw." 
Or we might say that a simple reaction system includes the 
linguistic hearing act plus the reply, with whatever language that 
contains. If the stimulus calls out definite precurrent acts, but only 
overt ones, as is the case when we first exclaim, "Oh, a saw," and 
then pull our hand away, we must assume that there is a greater 
degree of understanding or comprehension of the situation 
involved. Even more understanding or comprehension of the 
stimulating situation must be ascribed to the precurrent receptive 
language reactions when they accompany or precede thinking 
actions. In these cases we have very complex behavior segments 
or behavior patterns which are combination thinking and language 
reactions. We wonder whether it is not owing to the strikingness of 
these complex combination responses that the mistake can be 
made of identifying language and thought. The reader must 
observe that in all of our illustrations we have assumed that the 
language reactions are indirectly adapting responses connected 
with direct overt and implicit responses. Such are the typical ways 
in which our language reactions operate, for they are in the final 
analysis always definite adaptational reactions and are thus 
conditioned by the stimulating auspices. Further, it must be 
observed that although in our illustrations we dealt with language 
understanding responses serving as precurrent functions such re-
actions may themselves be final responses. 
(a) Reading and Comprehension1 Reactions.—To turn now to 
the more specific receptive language reactions we find here a 
series of specific types of understanding responses to a variety of 
different stimulating situations requiring different modes of 
contact such as visual, auditory or other sort. Reading, for 
example, covers a series of responses to language stimuli seen, 
while comprehension composes a number of responses to sounds 
heard, as in listening to verbal speech or other sound stimuli.    
The reaction systems operating here 
1 In the absence of a word to represent understanding responses for auditory 
stimuli corresponding to reading for visual stimuli the writer follows Professor Warren 
in using the term comprehension in a slightly technical sense. Cf. Warren, 'Human 
Psychology,' p. 320. 
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involve especially the visual and auditory receptor mechanisms, 
the optic and auditory neural pathways, localizable cortical 
mechanisms, all sorts of muscular mechanisms (eye, head, chest, 
laryngeal) and various speech processes. These different specific 
comprehension and seeing responses, it is well to observe, may 
involve different orders of action on the part of the responding 
individual. The stimuli of the comprehension and language 
reactions may be (1) intimate internal mechanisms in the sense of 
actual speech, or (2) partially external mechanisms as in the 
employnemt of signs or (3) mainly non-organismic mechanisms as 
in writing to a person or printing material for him. 
The term reading, let us note, covers not only the ordinary acts 
of perusing print but all forms of visual reactions to linguistic 
stimuli. Thus, we may speak of reading facial expressions and 
gestures of all sorts besides lip reading in its various forms. In all 
these cases reading constitutes adjustment responses, while in 
other situations as in vocal speech conversation the reading of 
expression and gestures constitutes auxiliary reactions either as (1) 
additional responses to the speech stimuli or (2) as direct reactions 
to gestural expressions serving as the setting factors of the vocal 
speech stimuli. 
What is meant by hearing is more definite and familiar and 
requires no further comment with the exception that we might 
suggest that just as in auditory reactions we find auxiliary visual 
components so in visual language reactions we may find auditory 
components, for example, implicit reactions to sound stimuli. As 
our last sentence indicates, we may think of reading as a general 
name for visual receptive language reactions, while the term 
comprehension serves in a similar capacity for all receptive 
auditory responses. 
(b) Tactual Receptive Language Reactions.—Reading and 
writing constitute what we may well call the normal and usual 
forms of receptive language reactions. Besides these types we find 
also, though in unusual cases only, that tactual reactions are also 
made to the transmissive reactions or language stimuli. Examples 
are the reactions of the deaf and blind to the lip movements of 
other persons and to the raised types of blind printing. 
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VII. The Varied Character of Language Phenomena.— From 
our study of language phenomena we may readily derive the 
notion concerning the multiple character of such facts. Not only is 
a language response a definite adaptation to stimuli but it may at 
the same time itself be a stimulus for another response. Moreover, 
as we have already intimated, it is necessary to separate the 
psychological facts of language from the physical, social and other 
phases of language and incidentally bring into sharper relief the 
functional and dynamic character of language. Probably we can 
best accomplish this our present purpose by analyzing a word. 
1. Non-Psychological Language Words.—(a) In the first place, 
a word may be considered merely as a purely physical or natural 
object which exists in nature exactly like any other physical thing 
and with the same characteristics. Here we mean to refer to a 
printed word (as it stands unread in a book) for example, or to a 
sound. Now of course in contrast with a physical object such as a 
stone we might say that the word as a physical object was invented 
or developed through some human agency, but this difference 
between a stone and a word is only relative, for surely all of the 
stones in our urban environment, at least, have been somehow 
transformed or modified through human agency, but this in no 
degree minimizes their physical or objective character. 
(b) A word may be considered also as a human institution and 
now we refer to the word as a member of a specific series of 
language customs. Here the word has a very different potential 
function but still it may exist totally unused and little known. Such 
instances are all of the words in the Moeso-Gothic language which 
exists only in the Bible version made by Bishop Ulfilas. 
(c) Another type of word which belongs to the class of the 
two previous words, namely non-psychological data, is the uttered 
word under certain circumstances. Now we are thinking of the 
word act, the act of speaking a word, which is merely 
morphologically language but not functionally so. Here we have 
random vocal actions which do not function either as an 
expressive or communicative adaptation.    For 
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instance, such a word as that uttered by a person when under the 
effect of ether. While these are undoubtedly psychological acts 
instead of natural or physical objects they are not data for the 
psychologist of language nor do they belong to the domain of 
psychological language behavior. 
2. Words as Definite Psychological Data.—All three of the 
words we have just discussed may be considered as things and 
acts, but not as serving any specific language function; they are 
independent of any immediate language use. We will next consider 
the words serving in some sort of language adjustment. Now let it 
be understood that in this case we may still be referring to these 
other words but now they are, psychologically speaking, in some 
functional relationship. From a psychological standpoint it is only 
in case words are in a stimulus-response relationship that we think 
of them as definite psychological data. We may differentiate then 
between the following forms of stimuli and response words as 
psychological language data. 
(a) Words as Stimuli.—Here we may speak of a printed word 
which serves as a definite stimulus to arouse a language response 
in some person, any kind of physical word which calls out an 
indirect reaction. This word we may look upon as a symbol, which 
presumably with or without the intention of anyone at this moment 
calls out a meaning or language response in some person. 
Also under this division we have word acts serving as stimuli 
language functions. Here we include definite verbal utterances 
which bring about responses on the part of some person whether 
the individual himself or some other person. We may consider 
these word-acts as stimuli, irrespective of whether the person 
intends them to be such, and so we might indicate here that we 
have two classes of definite language function, named, 
respectively, expressive and trans-missive stimulus word-acts. We 
may also observe that these words may operate as definite symbols 
in the same sense as the printed word. Probably in most cases in 
which the non-transmissive stimulus word-act operates, the total 
segment of behavior will not be language.    That is to say, 
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the word voluntarily performed by the person may still not serve 
to elicit a definite language response on the part of some other 
individual. 
(b) Words as Responses.—Here we think of the phases of the 
word in its functional operation as a response to some sort of 
stimulus, whether language or not. Now these words may be 
definite overt responses as in the case of answering questions, or 
they may be sub-vocal or other forms of verbal meaning and 
understanding responses. They may operate as final acts or as 
precurrent responses to some other final response. 
In summarizing this analysis of words as language data and the 
differentiation of them from various kinds of non-psychological 
data, notice that we may speak of what from the every-day 
standpoint is considered the same word, but this same word is both 
physical and psychological, and may be at the same time both a 
stimulus and a response. 
VIII. Summary.—(1) For objective psychology the problem of 
language is to place the prominent and pervasive linguistic 
reactions in their proper perspective with relation to the other 
coordinating functioning responses to stimuli and to avoid looking 
upon language as outer manifestations of mental states or the mere 
mechanics of speech. 
(2) As a preliminary approach to the analysis of language we 
have distinguished between anthropological data (language as 
cultural products or entities; the philological data (language as 
fixed conventional modes of phonetic systems and their symbolic 
representation) and the psychological data (language as 
adjustmental behavior, that is, definite responses to stimuli). To a 
considerable extent the materials of the anthropologist and the 
philologist may be looked upon purely as stimuli when they are 
phases of psychological situations. 
(3) A language act, being as definite a response as any other 
psychological act, must be somehow differentiated from other 
kinds of action. Our criterion is that language responses are 
inherently indirect or referential adaptations to stimuli, that is, they 
involve two stimuli, one the adjustment 
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stimulus, or the thing, person or situation acted upon or reacted to 
(for example a book to be picked up), the other an auxiliary 
stimulus or the person using language (giving a command, for 
example, for the book to be picked up). Two kinds of indirect 
action we may find, which we named respectively (1) mediative 
(language reactions connected with a direct reaction), and (2) 
referential (language reactions not connected with a direct 
response), the mediative type being related to direct action in three 
ways, namely, preceding, accompanying, or following, and the 
referential type either substituting for direct action or being purely 
conversational. 
(4) Because of the close relationship and apparent similarity 
between thought and language (a similarity which leads 
psychologists to identify the two), we compared these two types of 
behavior, pointing out that they constitute (a) different types of 
adaptive responses on the part of the person and (b) that the two 
operate very differently. 
(a) Thinking acts are either (1) planning, problem-solving, etc., 
definite adaptations to problematic or difficult situations or (2) 
simple implicit responses, that is to say, responses to absent 
adjustment stimuli aroused by a substitute stimulus. When thinking 
acts fall under (1) they are clearly different from conversation or 
language communication. So far as (2) is concerned, all types and 
modes of behavior may be implicitly performed including thinking 
(problem-solving), and consequently thought is no more identical 
with speech than with drinking or smoking. 
With respect to (b), whereas language is always indirect 
adaptation, thinking is always direct. 
Other facts militating against the identification of language and 
thought are (a) we can think and speak, or otherwise linguistically 
react, simultaneously to the same stimuli without any interference 
whatever. Also we can react to two entirely different stimuli at the 
same time when frequently it is possible to assume that either 
would require the use of the whole set of the same response factors 
that would have to be used in the other action, and (b) language 
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responses are different from thinking reactions (as implicit action 
at least) because they are more conventional. 
To all of this discussion it should be added that from a 
morphological standpoint at different times thought and language 
may involve of course the same structural elements. 
(5) Language reactions may be divided into various modes, 
(1) morphological (not serving true language function) and 
(2) functional (acting as a definite language response); the latter 
divided into (a) expressive (not involving any adjustive 
relationship to another person), and (b) communicative (involving 
adjustment to some other person). Communicative reactions are 
divided into (1) transmissive (language reactions serving as 
language stimuli) and (2) receptive (language reactions serving as 
responses only). Much of the expressive action may be 
communicative also, provided it serves as a language stimulus for 
some other person. 
 
(6) Language reaction systems can be classified on the basis 
of a communicative form of language into the following types: I. 
Primarily transmissive, (a) vocal speech, (b) vocal gesture, (c) 
sub-vocal speech, (d) non-vocal gesture, (e) making signs and 
symbols; II. primarily receptive language reactions or 
understanding responses, (a) reading and comprehension, and (b) 
tactual receptive language reactions. 
(7) Finally to differentiate between the various characters of 
language phenomena we analyzed words as follows: I. non-
psychological words—(a) as purely physical or natural objects, (b) 
as morphologically language but not functionally so, (c) as human 
institutions (language custom); II. psychological data-words, (a) 
words as stimuli, and (b) words as responses. 
